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 2 
Introduction 
 
The advent of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has prompted Public-Private 
Partnership (PPP) advocates to launch a renewed push for their use in providing 
network and social infrastructure and services.  This briefing suggests that claims that 
PPPs should be a central part of any attempt to address SDG commitments should be 
viewed with caution.  Prioritisation of PPPs may bias governments towards bankable 
projects rather than initiatives which best respond to social development objectives.  
Claims that PPPs are more efficient, better transfer risk and therefore represent better 
value-for-money are not backed up by the evidence.  Finally, particularly where 
institutional strength is weak, PPPs threaten to undermine democratic accountability 
and make problems with corruption worse, not better.  
 
Hall (2015, p. 39) has argued that states assessing PPPs should compare the alternative 
of public sector delivery, with value-for-money estimations broadened to include a 
full public impact analysis.  Eurodad (2015, p. 30) have demanded a halt to PPP 
promotion by international agencies until governments, under the auspices of the UN, 
have developed “… a set of comprehensive and development focused-principles and 
criteria for the use and assessment of PPPs.”  The UN Department for Economic and 
Social Affairs (KS et al., 2016, p. 21) has echoed this, calling for a complete re-visiting 
of PPP guidelines in light of the commitments made by signatory states to the SDGs. 
 
To adopt a cautious attitude towards the use of PPPs is not to abandon the expansion 
of infrastructure and services so critical to meeting the SDGs.  
 
Governments can take up this challenge by exploiting what fiscal space they have 
available for domestic resource mobilization and/or drawing upon national and 
regional development banks.  If a project is affordable employing a PPP, ultimately it 
can be afforded through direct state financing.   
 
Moreover, the public sector may be able to:  
 Exploit its cheaper costs of capital 
 Capture comparative efficiency gains through reduced transaction costs 
and uncertainty, and economies of scale and scope 
 Improve service design through increased stakeholder involvement, 
transparency and accountability 
 Show greater flexibility to respond to changing public demands.   
 
Charging public sector organisations with delivering these services provides 
opportunities for secure formal employment and skills training, and can help to build 
a strong public service ethos thereby cementing a healthy citizen-state relationship.  
As the example of remunicipalisation shows in the water sector (Pigeon et al., 2012), 
services returned to public ownership and provision can achieve social objectives and 
provide good value for money.  
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This briefing reviews the literature2 that critically evaluates why PPPs have failed to 
live up to the promises of their advocates and asks what challenges the use of PPPs 
may pose to achieving the SDGs.  We find that: first, prioritisation of the use of PPPs 
may bias the selection, design and delivery of services; second, assurances that PPPs 
are more efficient, better allocate risk and ultimately represent better value-for-
money may have been oversold; and, third, that problems of transparency, 
accountability, governance and corruption may be worsened rather than improved 
through the use of PPPs.  Confronting these issues is critical if developing countries 
are to make informed decisions about whether and how they should use PPPs to 
address SDG commitments on health, education, water and sanitation, and energy at 
the same time as they must fulfill obligations to end poverty and tackle inequality. 
 
Background on PPPs 
The Addis Ababa declaration on Financing for Development in 2015 emphasised the 
role of public-private partnerships3 (PPPs) in helping to deliver the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) (2015, p. 12–13).  Advocates of PPPs argued that the 
partnerships get network and social infrastructure built on-time and under-budget, 
ensure more efficient and sustainable operation of the related services, and help 
governments to better allocate risk, save taxpayers’ money and deliver on social 
development commitments. 
 
This revival in support for PPPs as a tool to address infrastructure gaps and social 
development objectives emanates from a number of sources.  Chief amongst these is 
advocacy from long-time PPP supporter, the World Bank Group.  The Bank’s PPP 
Group includes the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF), the PPP 
Knowledge Lab, a PPI database, PPP reference guides, a vast PPP training programme, 
and even a Massive Online Open Course, or MOOC.  World Bank support for PPPs, in 
the form of loans, investments and guarantees tripled between 2002 and 2012, from 
$0.9 billion to $2.9 billion (IEG, 2014, p. vi). 
 
There has been a stream of infrastructure funds established at the multilateral, 
regional and bilateral levels that promote a key role for the private sector, including 
the DFID-led Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG), the World Bank-led 
Global Infrastructure Facility (GIF), and, more recently, the new Chinese-led Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).  Add to this a series of multilateral initiatives 
involving both public agencies and philanthropic foundations, such as the Global 
Health Initiative, Harnessing Non-State Actors for Better Health for the Poor 
(HANSHEP), and the Global Green Growth Forum. 
 
                                                     
2 While there is an enormous literature concerned with the finer points of PPP management and 
centred on a handful of OECD countries (Neto et al., 2016), there is a much smaller literature on 
development impact. 
3 There is a lack of definitional clarity as to what exactly constitutes a PPP.  There is general 
agreement that it involves a contract between a public authority and a private entity for providing an 
asset or service.  However, the World Bank’s definition (WB PPP homepage), for example, says that 
the private party bears significant risk and management responsibility.  UN-DESA argues that, “… the 
definition of PPPs varies depending on the degree of ownership of assets and capital expenditure by 
the private partners.” (KS et al., 2016, p. 5) 
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A number of key developing country governments have made commitments to 
expanding their use of PPPs.  According to KPMG (2016), China “… has published a 
pipeline of more than 2,000 public-private partnership (PPP) projects.” This itself 
reflects the promotion efforts of an army of consulting firms and the private sector 
companies that are involved in PPPs themselves.    
 
Yet, despite this panoply of advisory initiatives, funds and marketing efforts, PPPs 
make up a relatively small proportion of infrastructure investment.  According to 
McKinsey (2016, p. 21) PPPs delivered just 6.4% of infrastructure investment in 
developing countries in 2015, a decline from 2010 levels4.  Moreover, this investment 
is highly concentrated geographically (in a handful of upper-middle-income 
countries), sectorally (in ICT and energy), and in takeovers rather than new investment 
(UNCTAD, 2015, p. 161).  What explains the failure of PPPs to live up to the hype? 
 
Selection, design and delivery: PPPs bias project selection towards profit 
Prioritisation of the use of PPPs, prevalent where governments are dependent on 
concessional finance or have established a dedicated PPP unit, biases governments 
towards projects, rather than addressing the more complex task of sectoral reform.  
Even where the discussion is limited to the project level, there may be a bias towards 
projects which are commercially viable over those which respond to public need.  
Simply put, private investors in infrastructure make their decisions based on whether 
or not a project is ‘bankable’ (Della Croce and Makovsek, 2016).   
 
As a mode of service delivery, PPPs may be less open to the involvement of a broad 
array of stakeholders in project design (Romero, 2015).  Once selected, there is the 
further risk that PPP projects will be designed so as to maximise returns, potentially 
at the cost of other objectives of public service delivery.  Such biases may permanently 
alter the citizen-state relationship in at least two ways: first, citizens may come to view 
the state as a profit-maximiser rather than a defender of the public interest; second, 
service providers, pushed to emphasise financial return over service quality, and 
laboring under squeezed pay and work conditions, may abandon the public sector 
ethos which has historically underpinned effective service delivery.    
 
PPPs can lead to a decline in workers’ rights and wages, rising inequality 
There are broader risks posed to workers by the introduction of PPPs in public service 
delivery (Hall, 2015, p. 37).  Profit-maximisation incentives often lead to cutbacks 
and/or increased use of casual contracts.  Marin (2009) finds that employment in Latin 
American water PPPs was cut by one-quarter to two-thirds.  Where workers lose their 
status as public employees, there may be a loss of pension benefits.  Breaking up what 
were once large public sector employers into smaller private sector contractors 
weakens union organization, making it more difficult to protect and improve pay and 
working conditions.   
                                                     
4 Figures include the transport, power, communication, and water & sanitation sectors, notably 
excluding health, education and housing amongst other sectors. 
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PPPs often cut services and undermine universal provision criteria 
PPPs may also have adverse effects on access to services.  This may occur through, for 
example, the imposition of tariffs on drinking water, fees on health and education 
services, or user charges on infrastructure.  PPP operators, when given room to 
manoeuvre permits, are likely to choose higher margin markets of wealthier 
customers.  In its review of the World Bank Group’s use of PPPs for the decade 2002-
2012, the Independent Evaluation Group (2014, p. 101) finds that there is little data 
on whether PPPs have benefitted the poor, with monitoring focused on commercial 
success rather than developmental impact (2014, p. 63).  An extensive review of 
literature on PPPs in developing countries, conducted by the Evaluation Department 
of the Government of the Netherlands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013) found the 
evidence for development outcomes and effectiveness was weak. 
 
PPPs are inflexible compared to public provision 
Once governments lock themselves in to long-term commercial contracts, payments 
must be met regardless of whether cutbacks to public spending are occurring in other, 
possibly more critical, sectors or projects.  Hall (2015, p. 36) cites the example of UK 
hospitals bankrupted by PFI commitments which were forced to merge with other 
local hospitals leading to cutbacks in services and staffing levels.  Oxfam, together with 
the Consumer Protection Association of Lesotho, (Marriott, 2014) has documented 
PPPs – in whose interests? 
The question marks raised over the claims of PPP advocates regarding efficiency 
and risk transfer have led some observers to ask who the promotion of PPPs is 
designed to benefit.   
Hildyard (2014, 2012) argues that the real purpose of PPPs is to respond to the 
needs of investors: “PPPs are about constructing the subsidies, fiscal 
incentives, capital markets, regulatory regimes and other support systems 
necessary to transform ‘infrastructure’ into an asset class that yields above 
average profits.” (2014, 10) 
In the increasingly dominant view of ‘infrastructure as asset class’, there are 
pressures for governments to standardise project preparation and evaluation, 
and act as a market maker by selling their infrastructure assets in order to 
increase the liquidity of the infrastructure market (McKinsey Global Institute, 
2016). 
 
In a study of 716 UK PPPs between 1998 and 2012, Whitfield (2012) documents 
the excess profits earned by firms in sales of their equity stakes in PPP project 
companies via secondary markets.  The average annual rate of return on the sale 
of equity was 29%, twice the 12-15% rate of return reported at the time of the 
financial close of the projects.  While the development of secondary markets in 
developing countries is only just beginning, he argues that as states “adopt PPP 
legislation and programmes and the number of PPP projects increases, equity 
transactions begin to occur in the first batch of projects leading to the formation 
of a secondary market.” (2012, p. 48) 
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the impact of a hospital PPP signed in 2009 under the advice of the IFC.  The country 
is locked into an 18-year contract that is using more than half of its health budget, 
while providing annual returns of 25 per cent rate of return on equity to the private 
partner.   
 
Efficiency, risk transfer, and value for money:  No evidence PPPs save money or 
attract capital 
PPP advocates cite the ability of PPPs to bring much-needed capital, technology and 
expertise to projects, resulting in more efficient service delivery and ultimately lower 
costs to the taxpayer.  However, at each stage of PPP implementation there are 
potential problems which undermine a simplistic equation of private provision with 
greater efficiency.   
 
PPPs are more expensive in the long run 
Lease payments to private partners do not replace the debt that would be incurred 
through direct state financing; indeed, they can be given a present value equivalent 
to debt.  This equivalent form of debt is more expensive because the state can raise 
funds at lower interest rates than the private sector. Particularly in large infrastructure 
projects, even a small difference in the cost of capital can add up to an enormous 
additional bill over the long run.  Alternatively, in PPPs where governments save 
current expenditure by handing over rights to a private firm to charge user fees, they 
forego the future revenue that would have been derived from public investment in 
the project.  The EIB (Blanc-Brude, Goldsmith and Välilä, 2006), in a comparison of 227 
new roads built in 15 European countries, 65 of which were PPPs, found that the “ex-
ante cost of a PPP road to be, on average, 24% more expensive than a traditionally 
procured road”. 
 
Profit motive distorts procurement process 
During the procurement process, private companies are incentivised to 
underestimate costs and overestimate the demand for services.  This becomes more 
problematic where ‘uncompetitive’ bids – including those that have been more 
realistically costed – are dropped after an initial bidding round, leaving a single or 
small number of ‘preferred bidders’ to draw up final proposals.  Where governments 
are required to open procurement to foreign firms, this can result in a small number 
of multinational companies dominating the bidding process.  Beyond the loss to 
domestic firms and national output, governments entering PPP contracts with 
multinationals (or equally if borrowing internationally) must assume foreign-currency 
denominated debt and the ensuing exchange rate risk (UNCTAD, 2015, p. 163). 
 
Transaction costs high in PPPs 
These problems with transaction costs and lowered competition continue into project 
implementation.  Before initiating a PPP, governments must ensure that an 
appropriate legal framework is in place, establish monitoring and enforcement 
systems, and engage in lengthy and complex negotiations.  International agencies, 
such as the PPIAF, have encouraged low- and middle-income countries to invest in 
these institutions at the cost of reduced spending in other budget lines.  In a study of 
over 1200 water and electricity utilities in 71 developing economies, Gassner et al. 
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conclude that private sector participation brings performance gains, however a lack 
of investment “raises concerns about the long-term improvements achieved” (2009, 
p. 4).  
 
PPPs are prone to monopoly capture 
Once begun, private providers may have an effective monopoly, giving them 
considerable power to renegotiate terms where initial estimates of revenues or costs 
have proven inaccurate.  A study by Gausch (2004) found that 42% of 670 PPPs studied 
in Latin America were renegotiated; in 60-70% of cases, the private operator was able 
to delay or reduce investment, or extract higher user fees.  This reduces governments’ 
flexibility to respond to changing realities on the ground, and introduces uncertainty 
regarding any costs of renegotiation.  Governments may be placed in a particularly 
difficult negotiating position where they are under SDG commitments to meet 
minimum service levels. 
 
In its evaluation of the World Bank’s use of PPPs, the IEG (2014, p. 97) found that 
there was little data on long-term performance.  A number of studies have 
suggested that, in consideration of the kind of issues discussed above, there should 
not be an assumption of superior efficiency in the private sector (Hall, 2015, p. 43). 
 
The myth of risk transfer 
Increasingly, even PPP advocates are placing less emphasis on the ability of PPPs to 
deliver better efficiency on a straight-forward cost basis, and are instead stressing the 
ability of a PPP to transfer risk 5 from the public authority to the private contractor 
where it can be borne more effectively.  Prominent in this line of argument is that the 
private sector bears the supply-side risk of delivering projects on time and on budget.  
However, what is usually not discussed is what price is paid by the government for the 
private sector taking on this risk?  Is that price higher than what would have been the 
cost of overruns had the project been implemented within the public sector?   
 
The second key area of risk referred to is demand-side risk.  First, it is not clear that 
the private sector is best placed to assume this kind of risk.  It may be, for example, 
that a decline in road toll fees is a positive development reflecting improved rail 
infrastructure, with ensuing benefits to the environment and worker productivity.  
Where borne by the private sector, such risk would entail financial loss and a claim for 
re-negotiation; where borne by the public sector, the risk can be spread across the 
larger population which benefits from the structural shift.  Second, even where the 
private sector may be able to bear demand side risk, once again it is not clear how 
such risk is best priced.  The IMF (2004, p. 14) warned that, “It is also possible that the 
government overprices risk and overcompensates the private sector for taking it on, 
which would raise the cost of PPPs relative to direct public investment.”    
 
 
                                                     
5 Risks associated with the provision of infrastructure include construction risk, operating risk, market 
or demand risk, financing risk, environmental risk, regulatory risk, legal/ 
political risk, foreign exchange risk, public policy risk, force majeure and 
residual value risk (Loxley and Loxley, 2010, p. 35). 
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Successful PPPs often rely on government regulation, not ‘market efficiency’ 
The other possibility is simply for the government to provide a series of demand or 
revenue guarantees, bringing into question the whole purpose of the PPP in the first 
place.  In Korea, following the Asian financial crisis, legislation was revised to sweeten 
risk-sharing mechanisms such as construction subsidies and minimum revenue 
guarantees (MRG) (Anon, 2014).  In the subsequent decade, Korea witnessed rapid 
growth in private infrastructure projects.  By 2011, the government burden for 36 
projects with MRGs was $2.6 billion.  After the MRG was abolished, private 
participation in infrastructure rapidly declined.     
 
Transparency, accountability, governance & corruption:  Better or worse? 
The introduction of a PPP turns what was once a public enterprise subject to freedom 
of information legislation (where such exists) into a private company protected by 
commercial confidentiality.  This is despite the fact that the enterprise remains, 
ultimately, entirely publicly funded.  
 
Governance and accountability become opaque 
 Monitoring PPP activities becomes nearly impossible in cases where ownership 
follows a byzantine hierarchy of shell companies, often involving the use of tax havens.  
NGO European Network on Debt and Development (Romero, 2015) has called on 
governments to release all documents relating to PPPs following the Open Contract 
Global Principles. 
 
PPPs hide government debt, create financial risk 
It may not be only the private sector partner that seeks to use the PPP to avoid public 
scrutiny.  PPPs have been used by governments to move capital expenditures ‘off 
balance sheet’, especially useful where states are bound by strict rules or 
conditionality governing the incurrence of debt.  The creation of such liabilities, both 
direct and contingent, can prove destabilizing to future governments who may not 
have been party to the original negotiations.  If a project delivering a critical service 
fails, it is almost inevitable that the privately-incurred debts are shifted on to the 
accounts of the state.  The IMF (2014) is so worried about the fiscal and other risks 
that PPPs pose that it has developed three tools to assess governments’ preparedness, 
identify potential risks and put in place mitigation measures. 
 
PPPs create the environment and incentives for corruption 
Finally, supporters of PPPs argue that the contracts force governments to be more 
transparent about infrastructure investment decisions, thereby eliminating 
opportunities for corrupt practices.  However, where large, long-term and lucrative 
contracts are under negotiation between government officials and corporations, the 
stakes are high, and the opportunities for corruption rife.  For example:  
 
- Numerous power station PPPs have been implicated in corruption, including 
Enron investments in Nigeria and India, and others in Tanzania, Pakistan, 
Indonesia and Slovakia (Hall, 2015, p. 32).  In Tanzania, a 20-year deal was 
signed in 1995 to provide what turned out to be unneeded electricity at an 
inflated price (Farlam, 2005, p. 28–9).  
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- Executives of subsidiaries of French water multinationals Suez and Veolia have 
been convicted for bribing public officials in the cities of Grenoble and 
Angouleme, and the island of Reunion (Godoy, 2003).  In 2002 an executive of 
Vivendi (now Veolia) was convicted of trying to win a wastewater treatment 
contract in Milan through bribing local politicians.   
 
- In New South Wales, a catalogue of violations have surfaced in a series of 
infrastructure PPPs, including manipulation of tendering and contract 
arrangements, and incompetence leading to cost overruns.  This leads 
Kouzmin et al. (2011) to label the projects E-SCADS, or economic state crimes 
against democracy. 
 
 
Conclusion and key findings 
 
We find that:  
 
 Prioritisation of the use of PPPs may bias the selection, design and delivery of 
services; 
 
 Assurances that PPPs are more efficient, better allocate risk and ultimately 
represent better value-for-money may have been oversold;  
 
 Problems of transparency, accountability, governance and corruption may be 
worsened rather than improved through the use of PPPs.   
 
Confronting these issues is crucial if developing countries are to make informed 
decisions about whether and how they should use PPPs to address SDG commitments 
on health, education, water & sanitation, and energy at the same time as they must 
fulfill obligations to end poverty and tackle inequality. 
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